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Abstract. Password-based Authenticated Key-Exchange (PAKE) protocols al-
low the establishment of secure communication entirely based on the knowledge
of a shared password. Over the last two decades, we have witnessed the debut
of a number of prominent security models for PAKE protocols, whose aim is
to capture the desired security properties that such protocols must satisfy when
executed in the presence of an active adversary. These models are usually classi-
fied into i) indistinguishability-based (IND-based) or ii) simulation-based (SIM-
based). However, the relation between these two security notions is unclear and
mentioned as a gap in the literature. In this work, we prove that SIM-BMP se-
curity from Boyko et al. (EUROCRYPT 2000) implies IND-RoR security from
Abdalla et al. (PKC 2005) and that IND-RoR security is equivalent to a slightly
modified version of SIM-BMP security. We also investigate whether IND-RoR
security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP security. The results obtained also hold
when forward secrecy is incorporated into the security models in question.
1 Introduction
The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) problem asks for two enti-
ties, who only share a password, to engage in a conversation so that they agree on
a session key. The established session key can be used to protect their subsequent
communication. PAKE protocols play a key role in today’s world as they allow
for authenticated key exchange to occur without the use of Public-Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI), by using a human-memorable password instead. Theoretically, they
are fascinating, because of their ability to use a weak secret – such as a password
or a pin – to produce a strong cryptographic key in a provably secure way over a
hostile communications network.
The nature of passwords makes PAKE protocols vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
In such attacks, an adversary tries to break the security of the protocol by exhaus-
tively enumerating all possible passwords until a guess is correct. This strategy
might not be very successful on AKE schemes where the legitimate entities share
a high-entropy key as long-term secret. However, in the PAKE setting the long-
term secrets come from a small set of values, i.e. a dictionary, posing a genuine
security threat.
We distinguish between two types of possible dictionary attacks: offline and on-
line dictionary attacks. In an offline dictionary attack, the adversary uses interac-
tion with the honest parties – or mere eavesdropping – to get information about
the password that allows him to launch an exhaustive offline search. In an online
dictionary attack, an attacker takes a password from the set of possible passwords,
interacts with a legitimate party by running the protocol and checks whether the
key exchange succeeds for the candidate password or not.
The cryptographic goal when designing PAKE protocols is to ensure that the
attacker essentially cannot do better than an online dictionary attack. This goal
recognizes that while online dictionary attacks cannot be avoided, offline dictio-
nary attacks can and should be prevented. Numerous PAKE protocols have been
designed to meet this goal but have later been found to be flawed [1–3]. Con-
sequently, security models for PAKE have been devised to get assurance on the
claimed security properties by performing a rigorous analysis.
In this work, we consider the provable security approach, where protocols are
analyzed in a complexity-theoretic security model: the goal being that no rea-
sonable algorithm can violate security under various hardness assumptions. The
complexity-theoretic security models are classified into indistinguishability-based
(IND-based) and simulation-based (SIM-based). In the IND-based approach se-
curity means that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PTT) adversary can distin-
guish an established session key sk from a random string, i.e. it guarantees se-
mantic security on sk. The SIM-based approach defines two worlds: an ideal
world which is secure by definition and the real world which is the real protocol
execution against some PPT attacker. In the SIM-based setting, security asks for
the indistinguishability between the ideal world and real world executions.
When dealing with formal security modeling of PAKE, the difference between
the two previously mentioned approaches, IND and SIM, has practical conse-
quences. It is accepted that IND-based models are easier to work with for proto-
col designers that wish to prove the security of their protocols. In fact, currently,
most of the security proofs for PAKEs are constructed under the IND-based mod-
els Find-then-Guess (IND-FtG) from [4] and Real-or-Random (IND-RoR)1 from
[5]. In contrast, constructing security proofs in SIM-based models is considered
more challenging. Two SIM-based models for PAKE that have seen wider use
are Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel’s (BMP) model [6] that is derived from Shoup’s
SIM-based model for AKE [7] and the Universal Composability (UC) framework
of Canetti et al. [8] that follows the UC paradigm of Canetti [9]. While complex
for constructing proofs of security, it is fair to recognize that SIM-based secu-
rity i) offers a more intuitive and natural approach to defining security, ii) it is
simpler to describe and interpret the security properties captured by the model,
iii) SIM-secure protocols are well suited to accommodate secure composition re-
sults, and iv) it is possible to prove security of PAKE protocols even in the case
of correlated passwords that may come from arbitrary password distributions.
The known relations between PAKE security definitions are summarized in Fig-
ure 1. In particular, to the best of the knowledge of the authors, no work has
been done to formally analyze the relation between the IND-RoR and SIM-BMP
1 IND-RoR is a refinement of IND-FtG model in which the adversary has access to multiple test
queries instead of a single one.
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Fig. 1. Known relations between PAKE security definitions [10].
security notions for PAKE.2 As we can see in Figure 1, the only existing result
that is known to hold between IND and SIM based definitions is the one from
[8]. There, the authors show that their SIM-UC definition implies the IND-FtG
definition from [4].
In practical terms, the lack of comparison results between IND-based and SIM-
based models for PAKEs means that the security of PAKE protocols, such as
SPEKE,3 that have been studied in the SIM-BMP simulation model of [6] can not
be compared with other PAKE protocols that are secure according to the SIM-UC
or IND definitions.
Forward Secrecy. Commonly referred as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), it is a
security property for Authenticated Key-Exchange (AKE) and PAKE protocols.
Roughly speaking, it ensures the protection of session keys – negotiated between
two honest participants – even if the underlying long-term secret material (pass-
words for PAKEs) later gets compromised [15]. It is a highly desirable security
property specially for PAKEs as unfortunately, there exist in real life different
ways in which the adversary could obtain such password information e.g. via
phishing attacks a cheated client could reveal his password to some malicious
entity or the data base storing the client’s password at the server could get com-
promised resulting in massive password leakage [16–18]. Therefore, it has been
explicitly a design goal in relevant PAKEs [19, 20].
The intuition of forward secrecy was first mentioned by Diffie et al. in [15]. It was
later formalized and incorporated in AKE [7, 21–23] and PAKE [4, 24] security
models. It is indisputable that this formalization enhanced the understanding of
forward secrecy by identifying distinct means in which a principal can get com-
promised and the information revealed to the adversary in such a case. However, it
produced a number of definitions and variations on forward secrecy which might
make it difficult to tell under which circumstances protocol “P” is fs-secure. For
example, just in [4] the authors provide three different definitions for forward
secrecy.
2 The result by Shoup [7] on the equivalence between IND-FTG model and SIM model for
authenticated key exchange with a high-entropy long-term secret does not carry over to the
PAKE setting. The reason for this is that there is a non-negligible upper bound on the advantage
of the adversary in IND-based security definitions for PAKE. This, in turn, does not admit loose
reductions.
3 The SPEKE protocol [11] is one of the most well-known PAKE designs. It has been proposed
by Jablon in 1996 and proven secure in the SIM-BMP model under the Random Oracle (RO)
assumption by MacKenzie [12]. SPEKE is practically relevant as it is specified in the ISO/IEC
11770-4 [13] and IEEE P1363.2 [14] standards.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We first reconcile the syntactic differences between the IND-RoR and SIM-
BMP models for PAKE thus allowing honest comparison between them.
More specifically, we slightly modify the initialization procedure of the IND-
RoR model [5] such that it follows the SIM-BMP model.
– We incorporate forward secrecy into the SIM-BMP and IND-RoR security
models. We consider only the weak corruption model as defined in [4], which
is the most used type of forward secrecy.
– We prove that SIM-BMP security implies IND-RoR security and that IND-
RoR security is equivalent to a slightly modified version of SIM-BMP se-
curity adapted to the model of [25]. We also investigate whether IND-RoR
security implies (unmodified) SIM-BMP security.
– The results in this paper are based on the earlier conference paper [10]. Here,
we extend the results obtained earlier and show that they also hold when for-
ward secrecy in the weak corruption model is incorporated into the security
models in question.
1.2 Related Work
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). The complexity theoretic treatment of se-
curity for AKE protocols was initiated by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 [26].
In their groundbreaking work, they followed the indistinguishability (IND) ap-
proach to formalize the notion of security for AKE protocols, using previously
established symmetric keys as long-term secrets and considering the realistic sce-
nario of concurrent sessions running on a network under full control of the adver-
sary. In their model, an AKE protocol is secure if, under the allowed adversary
actions, the established session key is computationally indistinguishable from a
random string. After this initial work, numerous others have appeared studying
the cryptographic security for AKE protocols following the IND-based approach
[22, 21, 27–31].
In parallel, the first simulation (SIM) definition for AKE was given by Bellare,
Canetti and Krawczyk [32]. In 1999, Shoup proposed another security model for
AKE protocols in the SIM-based setting [7] and informally compared his model
with the one from [32]. In the same work, the author gave a sketch of a proof
arguing that SIM-security against both static and adaptive adversaries is equiv-
alent to the corresponding IND-security notions of [27]. Canetti and Krawczyk
in [33] took SIM definitions further by expanding the composition guarantees of
AKE from [7] to arbitrary protocols within the Universal Composability (UC)
framework of Canetti [9].
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE). The idea of PAKE has been
first put forward by Bellovin and Meritt in [34]. Their proposal, the EKE proto-
col, was the first to show that it is possible to design a password authentication
mechanism that can withstand offline dictionary attacks. The SPEKE protocol
from Jablon [11] soon appeared, following a very different design strategy. How-
ever, both of these works included only informal security justifications. The first
adequate security models for PAKE appeared in [4] and [6] around the same
time. Both models were built upon already existing AKE models. Although the
SIM-based model from [6] has been used to prove secure several PAKE pro-
tocols (PAK [6], RSA-based SNAPI [35], and SPEKE [12]), it is the IND-FtG
model from [4] that has established itself as the model of choice when analyzing
PAKEs. Using the IND-FtG model, Katz et al. [36] managed to achieve a break-
through: they have shown how one can efficiently realize PAKE without random
oracles, but instead relying on a common reference string (CRS). In more theo-
retical work, Goldreich and Lindell [25] proposed a PAKE in the plain model4
that follows the simulation tradition. A few years later, Abdalla et al. [5] showed
that a stronger model than IND-FtG is necessary when trying to achieve three-
party PAKE. Hence, they proposed a new model, known as the IND-RoR model,
which is proven to be stronger than the IND-FtG model in the case of PAKE.
Recently, Sˇkrobot and Lancrenon [37] have shown that the IND-FtG model may
not be enough when looking at composition between PAKEs and arbitrary sym-
metric key protocols (SKP). However, on the positive side, they have shown that
IND-RoR secure PAKE protocols with weak forward secrecy can be safely com-
posed with arbitrary, higher-level SKPs. For these reasons, the IND-RoR model –
enriched to handle forward secrecy – is considered the state-of-the-art model and
has been used in the analysis of most recent PAKE protocols [38, 39]. Another
model which is prominent in PAKE research is the Universal Composability (UC)
framework for PAKE of Canetti et al. [8]. This model has been recently extended
to treat augmented PAKEs [40] - asymmetric PAKE protocols in which a server
holds a hard-to-invert function5 of the password. For more relevant papers on
PAKE, we refer the reader to Pointcheval’s survey [41].
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the Real-
or-Random model for PAKE due to Abdalla et al. [5]. Next, in Section 3, we in-
troduce the simulation-based model for PAKE from Boyko et al. [6]. We assume
some familiarity with the models and refer to the original publications for a full
description. Section 4 examines the relation between the Real-Or-Random model
of [5] and the simulation-based model of Boyko et al. [6]. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 5.
2 The Real or Random Security Model for PAKE
The Real-or-Random (IND-RoR) security model for 2-party PAKE was intro-
duced by Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval in [5]. In this section, we present an
augmented version of the original model that allows us to explicitly incorporate
the requirement of forward secrecy. Before we recall the IND-RoR model with
forward secrecy, we introduce the notation that will used in the paper.
4 In the plain model, the security of a cryptosystem is proved using only general complexity
assumptions and no trusted setup.
5 Due to the low entropy of passwords such function can be inverted in practice by applying
dictionary attacks.
2.1 Notation
Let S be a set with cardinality |S|. We write s $←− S to denote sampling uniformly at
random from S. The output of a probabilistic algorithm D on input x is denoted by
y← D(x), while y := D(x,r) denotes the (deterministic) output of an algorithm
D on input x and fixed random coins r. Adversaries (respectively, challengers)
will be denoted A (resp. CH ) in the IND-RoR model and B (resp. RM ) in
the SIM model. The directory of passwords is pw, PPT stands for probabilistic
polynomial-time and λ is the security parameter. A function f : N→ R+ is said
to be negligible if it decreases faster than the inverse of any polynomial and the
symbol negl designates some unspecified negligible function. We write A
c≡ B to
denote two computationally indistinguishable distributions.
2.2 Description of the IND-RoR Model with Forward Secrecy
The so called IND-RoR model of Abdalla et al. [5], defines security via a game
played between a challenger CH and some adversary A whose goal is to distin-
guish real session keys from random strings. It follows from the Find-then-Guess
(IND-FtG) model of [4], however, the IND-RoR model allows A to ask multi-
ple test queries to different instances while the IND-FtG restricts A to a single
test query. This simple yet important change results in the IND-RoR model being
strickly stronger than the IND-FtG model for PAKE. This is in contrast with the
AKE scenario in which the two models are considered equivalent.
Recall that in [4], several variants of the IND-FtG model are described: these
models can be differentiated depending on the type of forward secrecy they are
trying to capture. Nevertheless, the original IND-RoR model from [5] does not
include a forward secrecy requirement. In this section, we present an augmented
version6 of the original IND-RoR model to incorporate forward secrecy by fol-
lowing [42, 4], which we will simply refer as FS-IND-RoR to differentiate from
the original IND-RoR model.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS. Each participant in a two party PAKE protocol
is either a client C ∈ C or a server S. Let U = C ⋃S denote the set of all (hon-
est) participants. Additionally, each initialized participant U is associated with a
unique identifier idU . During the execution of the protocol, there might be several
running instances of each participant. A running instance i of some participant
U ∈U is called an oracle instance and is denoted by ΠiU .
LONG-TERM SECRETS. Server S holds a password pi for each client C, i.e. it
holds a vector L =< pii >i∈C . In the opposite direction, client C shares a single
password pi with server S. For simplicity let pi also denote the function assigning
passwords to pair of users. We will refer to pi[idC, idS] as the password shared
between client C and server S. Note that pi[idC, idS] = pi[idS, idC], while pi[idC, idC]
is not allowed in the model. The passwords are assumed to be independent and
uniformly distributed.
6 Note that, in addition to the treatment of forward secrecy, we will introduce a minor change
to the IND-RoR and the SIM-BMP model to allow for meaningful comparison between them.
Otherwise, the models would be syntactically incomparable. Whenever possible, we prefer to
change the SIM-BMP model rather than IND-RoR since the latter is more widespread.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION. Protocol P is an algorithm that describes how par-
ticipants behave in response to inputs from their environment. Each participant
can run P in parallel with different partners, which is modeled by allowing an
unlimited number of instances of each participant to be created. We assume the
presence of an adversary A who has full control over the network i.e. she entirely
controls the communication between legitimate entities. She can enumerate, off-
line, the words of the password directory pw.
SECURITY EXPERIMENT IN FS-IND-ROR MODEL. Security in the IND-RoR
model with forward secrecy is defined via a game played between the challenger
CH and adversary A . At the beginning of the experiment, CH tosses a coin and
sets b ∈ {0,1} outside of A’s view. Then A is given access to i) endless supply
of user instances ΠiU and ii) oracle queries to control them. Oracle queries are
answered by the corresponding ΠiU according to P. A’s goal is to find out the
value of the hidden bit b. Next, we summarize the oracle queries A can access
during the security experiment.
– Initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ).A assigns the string idU as identity and roleU ∈
{client,server} to user U ∈U, subject to the restriction that idU has not been
already assigned to another user. There are two cases:
• If roleU = server we simply write S instead of U . Then, for every ini-
tialized client C ∈ C with idC, a password is picked uniformly at random
from the dictionary pw and assigned to the corresponding pair of client-
server, i.e. pi[idC, idS]
$←− pw.
• In case roleU = client we shall simply write C instead of U . Then, pro-
vided that S has already been initialized with idS, do pi[idC, idS]
$←− pw.
– Initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pid
i
U ). An instance i ∈ N of initialized
user U ∈ U is created and denoted by ΠiU . It is assigned i) a role roleiU ∈
{open,connect} and ii) a partner identity pidiU corresponding to the identity
of some user U ′ that ΠiU is supposed to communicate with in the future. The
following constraint must hold:
• roleU and roleU ′ are complementary, i.e. roleU = server and roleU ′ =
client or the other way around.
User instances are modeled as state machines with implicit access to the
protocol description P and its corresponding password, i.e. some ΠiU with
pidiU = idU ′ is given access to pi[U, pid
i
U ].
– Send (U, i,m). A sends message m to user instance ΠiU . The latter behaves
according to the protocol description, sends back the response m′ to A (if
any) and updates its state as follows:
• continue: ΠiU is ready to receive another message.
• reject:ΠiU aborts the protocol execution and sets the session key skiU =⊥.
This can be due to receiving an unexpected message m.
• accept: ΠiU holds pidiU , session identifier sidiU and skiU . However, ΠiU
still expects to receive another message to fulfill the protocol specifica-
tion.
• terminate: ΠiU holds pidiU , sidiU and skiU . It has completed the protocol
execution and will not send nor receive any other message.
– Execute (U, i,U ′, j). The transcript of the execution is returned toA . It mod-
els honest execution of the protocol between ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ .
– Corrupt(U). A learns the long-term secret information of some initialized
user U . If roleU = client, then A gets piU . Otherwise, if roleU = server, then
A receives L =< pii >i∈C .
– Test (U, i). A asks for the session key of user instance ΠiU . Provided that
statusiU = terminate, CH responds as follows 7:
• If there was a Corrupt (U∗) query -where U∗ can be any user- and a
Send query directed to ΠiU before the sk is computed, then A gets the
real sk of ΠiU . Otherwise:
• CH responds using the bit b. If b = 1 then A gets the real sk of ΠiU , if
b= 0 she gets a random string r $←−{0,1}lsk , where lsk denotes the length
of session keys. To ensure consistency, whenever b= 0 the same random
string is returned for test queries asked to two partnered instances.
Matching Instances. Two instances, ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ , are matching instances if:
– pidiU = idU ′ , pid
j
U ′ = idU
– Users have complimentary roles, i.e. one has role client and the other has
role server.
– User instances have complimentary roles, i.e. one instance has the role open
and the other connect.
Partnering. Two matching instances ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ are partners if both instances
accept – each holding pidiU , sid
i
U , sk
i
U and pid
j
U ′ , sid
j
U ′ , sk
j
U ′ respectively – and
the following holds:
– sidiU = sid
j
U ′ and sk
i
U = sk
j
U ′
– No oracle besides ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ accepts with some sid
′ = sidiU , except with
negligible probability.
Advantage of the adversary. During the experiment, A is allowed to ask several
test queries directed to different oracle instances ΠiU in the terminate state. All
these queries are answered depending on the bit b chosen at the beginning of the
experiment with either the real session key if b = 1 or a random string otherwise.
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b, i.e. if she
distinguished real session keys from random strings. The advantage of A in the
FS-IND-RoR security game for protocol P and passwords sampled uniformly at
random from dictionary pw is defined as follows:
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A) := 2 ·Pr(b′ = b)−1. (1)
Definition 1. Protocol P is FS-IND-RoR secure if
1. (Completeness) If protocol messages are faithfully transmitted between two
matching instances then both instances accept and compute the same key.
2. (Bounded Adversary Advantage) For all PPT adversaries A:
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A)≤
n
|pw| +negl(λ) , (2)
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized by A and λ
is the security parameter.
Remark 1. As we mentioned before, different flavors of forward secrecy exist in
the literature, e.g. just in [4] the authors provide three particular definitions which
could either weaken or strengthen the security guaranteed by the model in case
of compromise of long term secret information. While the intuition of forward
secrecy and the security guarantee that it aims to provide are understood, it is
7 This is commonly referred as freshness condition.
unclear which definition of forward secrecy is de facto the right one for PAKE
protocols. Therefore, to be explicit, we consider forward secrecy in the weak
corruption model described in [4], where corruption of some principal leaks only
its password to the adversary, i.e. no internal state is revealed.
In the Client-Server setting, it is reasonable to assume that compromise of the
server leaks the whole password data file to the adversary, even for asymmetric
PAKEs. Thus, the model pessimistically renders every instance, whose session
key was negotiated after someone got corrupted, as compromised and no security
is guaranteed. Such a case is formalized in the Test query, which is answered
with the real session key, i.e. independently of the bit b, whenever the previously
mentioned scenario occurs. We note that it is possible to fine-tune the model by
distinguishing compromise of a server from a client’s one, however, it will place
new cumbersome conditions to the Test query making the analysis more complex
and without gaining some significant improvement.
Remark 2. When using passwords as means of authentication, there is a non-
negligible probability of an adversary successfully impersonating an honest user
by simply guessing its password. This problem is unavoidable and inherent to
PAKE protocols. Consequently, the security definition considers a PAKE protocol
to be secure if only on-line dictionary attacks are possible i.e. the protocol should
not leak any information that allows the adversary to obtain the password in an
off-line manner.
3 Security in the Simulation Mode with Forward
Secrecy
SIM-based security requires the definition of two scenarios: i) an Ideal World
(IW ) which describes the key exchange service that is meant to be provided and
ii) a Real World (RW ) to describe the real interaction between honest protocol
participants and an adversary attacking the protocol. The IW is designed in such
a way that it is secure by definition and follows the desired security properties
that a PAKE should satisfy.
When dealing with passwords as long-term secret information for authentication,
the security model has to acknowledge the non-negligible probability of an ad-
versary guessing the correct password and successfully impersonating an honest
user. There are two ways to incorporate this defect due to the low entropy of pass-
words in the SIM-based security model; the first approach is considered in [6, 8]
while the second in [25, 43]:
1. Incorporate the non-negligible probability of an adversary guessing the pass-
word into the ideal world, by explicitly allowing the ideal world adversary to
verify the guess of a candidate password. Then one defines a protocol to be
secure if the real-world execution is computationally indistinguishable from
an execution in the ideal world.
2. Do not allow password guessing in the ideal world but relax the requirement
of indistinguishability between the real world and ideal world transcripts.
One defines a protocol to be secure as one whose real-world execution is
distinguishable from an execution in the ideal world with probability at most
n/|pw|+ negl(λ), where n is the number of active user instances and pw is
the dictionary. Keep in mind that we make use of this approach in Section 4
when we prove Theorem 3.
For now we consider only the first approach. We augment the original SIM-BMP
model of Boyko et al. [6] to account for scenarios where forward secrecy is re-
quired. For clarity, we refer to the later simulation model with forward secrecy
as FS-SIM-BMP to distinguish from the original one. The inclusion of this secu-
rity property in the SIM-BMP model allows us to provide a fair comparison to
the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy as described in Section 2, otherwise,
the models would be incomparable simply because they aim for different secu-
rity guarantees. We consider forward secrecy in the weak corruption model as
described in [4, 7] for this task.
3.1 Ideal World
The ideal world (IW ) model describes the service that a PAKE aims to provide,
i.e. to allow parties to jointly compute a high entropy secret session key, which
can be used later in higher level applications. In the IW there are no messages
flowing around the network nor cryptography. The session keys are chosen at
random by a trusted party and delivered out-of-band to the honest users.
Formally, the ideal world involves interaction between a trusted entity called ideal
world Ring Master and an ideal world adversary, denoted by RM ∗ and B∗ re-
spectively. The ring master is similar to the challenger in the FS-IND-RoR ex-
periment. The details of the ideal world execution follow.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS: As defined in the FS-IND-RoR model.
LONG-TERM SECRETS: The FS-SIM-BMP model does not make any assump-
tion on the password distribution. However, to allow a fair comparison to the
FS-IND-RoR model, we assume the passwords to be independent and uniformly
distributed.
PROTOCOL EXECUTION: There is no protocol execution in the ideal world.
The session key of an instance is generated by the RM ∗ when B∗ asks that
instance the start session query. Additionally B∗ is given access to the following
oracles:
– Initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ). Identical to that in the FS-IND-RoR model.
[Transcript:(“init. user”,U,roleU )]
– Initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pid
i
U ). Identical to that in the FS-IND-RoR
model.
[Transcript: (“init. inst.”,U, i, pidiU )]
8
– Abort user instance (U, i) Adversary B∗ asks RM ∗ to abort user instance
ΠiU . We say then that Π
i
U is aborted.
[Transcript: (“abort. user inst.”,U, i)]
8 Note that the original SIM-BMP model [6] also places roleiU in the transcript, but we have
chosen to remove it. This is because in the ideal world, from two partnered instances, the one
with the role “open” will always start session first. On the other hand, in the real world, the
adversary is free to choose which instance is assigned role “open” and which “connect”. Thus,
a real world adversary could make an honest execution of a protocol between an instance with
role “connect” that terminates first, and an instance with role “open” that terminates second.
Such a transcript, which constitutes an honest execution of a protocol, would not be simulatable
in the ideal world if the roles “open” and “connect” are placed in the transcript.
– Test instance password (U, i,pi′). For user instance ΠiU and password guess
pi′, B∗ queries if pi′ equals pi(U, pidiU ). If this is true, the query is called
successful guess on {U, pidiU}.
This query can be asked only once per user instance. The user instance must
be initialized and not yet engaged in a session, i.e. no start session operation
has been performed for that instance. Note that B∗ is allowed to ask a test
instance password query to an instance that is aborted. This query does not
leave any records in the transcript.
– Corrupt (U). B∗ learns the long-term secret information of some initialized
user U . If roleU = client, then B∗ gets piU . Otherwise, if roleU = server,
then B∗ receives L =< pii >i∈C .
[Transcript: (“Corrupt”,U,piU )]
– Start session(U, i). B∗ specifies that a session key for user instanceΠiU must
be generated, by specifying one of the three connection assigments available:
• open for connection from (U ′, j). This operation is allowed if: c1)
roleiU = open and user instances Π
i
U and Π
j
U ′ are matching instances,
c2) Π jU ′ has been initialized and not aborted, c3) no other instance is
open for connection from Π jU ′ and c4) no test instance password opera-
tion has been performed on ΠiU . Then RM
∗ generates session key skiU
at random. Then ΠiU is said to be open for connection from Π
j
U ′ .
• connect to (U ′, j). This operation is allowed if: c1) roleiU = connect
and user instances ΠiU and Π
j
U ′ are matching instances, c2) Π
j
U ′ has
been initialized and not aborted, c3) Π jU ′ was open for connection from
ΠiU after Π
i
U was initialized and Π
j
U ′ is still open for connection and
c4) no test instance password operation has been performed on ΠiU .
The RM ∗ sets skiU = sk
j
U ′ and Π
j
U ′ is no longer open for connection.
• expose (U, i,sk). B∗ assigns session key sk of his choice to user in-
stance ΠiU . This connection assignment is allowed if at least one of the
following conditions hold: i) there has been a successful test instance
password on ΠiU or ii) there was a Corrupt query, directed to any user,
before the start session operation.
[Transcript: (“start session”,U, i)]
– Application ( f ,U, i). The adversary specifies an efficiently computable func-
tion f and a user instance ΠiU for which a session key sk
i
U has already been
established. It gets back f ({skiU},R), where R is a global random bit string
which user instances are given access to. R is not correlated to the estab-
lished session keys and usually is referred to as the environment.
[Transcript: (“application”, f , f (skiU ,R))]
– Implementation. This is a do nothing operation. B∗ is allowed to place
implementation operations without taking any effect in the ideal world. It
is needed to allow B∗ to construct transcripts that are equivalent to those in
the real world.
[Transcript: (“impl”,cmmt)]
Transcript. Some of the previously mentioned queries are recorded in a tran-
script. Let IWT ∗ denote the transcript generated by B∗.
Remark 3. The SIM-BMP model handles on-line dictionary attacks, which are
unavoidable and inherent to PAKEs, by introducing the notion of passwords and
specifically the test instance password query in the ideal world definition. This
approach places the fundamental requirement that an active adversary can test at
most one password per protocol execution. In fact, provided that the PAKE in
question should be deemed SIM-BMP secure, the test instance password allows
the simulator to create ideal world transcripts which are computationally indis-
tinguishable from real world ones.
In a more general sense, the expose connection assignment is allowed whenever
the adversary could compute by his own the session key shared with some in-
stance ΠiU , e.g. a successful online dictionary attack or a Corrupt query asked be-
fore the connection assignment. This is similar to the freshness condition defined
for IND-based models, which prevents the adversary from winning the experi-
ment by trivial means.
The purpose of running PAKE protocol is to later use the established session keys
in higher-level application protocols, e.g. the construction of secure communica-
tion channels is their most natural application. However, partial information about
the established session key could potentially be leaked to the adversary through
the usage of such keys, e.g. cryptanalysis, side channel attacks, etc. The applica-
tion query models the ability of the adversary to get any information she wishes
about the environment and the established session keys. The function f is defined
by B∗, the only constraint is that it must be efficiently computable.
3.2 Real World
The real-world (RW ) describes the scenario where a PAKE protocol runs. There is
a real world Ring Master (RM ), whose role is similar to the role of the challenger
in the FS-IND-RoR experiment, and a real-world adversary B who tries to attack
the PAKE.
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS: Identical to IW .
LONG-TERM SECRETS: Identical to IW .
PROTOCOL EXECUTION: The same as in the FS-IND-RoR model. Also, user
instances are defined as state machines with implicit access to idU , pidiu and the
corresponding password. The communication between the instances is entirely
controlled by B via the following queries:
– Initialize user(U, idU ,roleU ). Identical to that in the FS-IND-RoR model.
[Transcript:(“init. user”,U,roleU )]
– Initialize user instance(U, i,roleiU , pid
i
U ). This is identical to that in the
FS-IND-RoR model.
[Transcript: (“init. inst.”,U, i, pidiU )]
– Send (U, i,m). The same as in the FS-IND-RoR model except that the fol-
lowing is added to the transcript:
[Transcript: (“impl”, “msg”,U, i,m,m′,stateiU )]. Additionally, the following
record is added to the transcript depending on stateiU .
If stateiU = “terminate” add (“start session”,U, i).
If stateiU = “abort” add (“abort”,U, i).
– Corrupt (U). The same as in IW .
[Transcript: (“Corrupt”,U,piU )]
– Application ( f ,U, i). The same as in IW .
[Transcript: (“application”, f , f (skiU ,R))]
Transcript. Let RWT be the transcript generated by B . This is a sequence of
records describing the actions of B when interacting with the real world protocol.
RM generates B’s random tape and places it in the first record of the transcript.
[Transcript: (“impl”,“random tape”,rt)].
Definition 2. A protocol is FS-SIM-BMP secure if
1. (Completeness) If protocol messages are faithfully transmitted between two
matching instances then both instances accept and compute the same key.
2. (Simulatability) for every efficient real-world adversary B , there exists an
efficient ideal world adversary B∗, such that RWT c≡ IWT ∗. Alternatively:
∀B ∃B∗ ∀D : |Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]| ≤ negl(λ). (3)
4 Relations between FS-IND-RoR and FS-SIM-BMP
In this section, we establish the relations between FS-IND-RoR and FS-SIM-BMP
security models for PAKEs. The results obtained follow from earlier conference
paper [10]. The difference is that in the present work the considered security
models incorporate the notion of forward secrecy as security requirement.
We start by showing that FS-SIM-BMP security implies FS-IND-RoR security.
Table 1. Correspondence of A’s and B’s queries. It follows from Table 1 in the earlier conference
paper [10], however, in this work we additionally consider the Corrupt query.
FS-IND-RoR FS-SIM-BMP
init user init user
init user instance init user instance
send send
execute send
test application
corrupt corrupt
Theorem 1. (FS-SIM-BMP Security ⇒ FS-IND-RoR Security). For any PAKE
protocol P secure in the SIM-BMP model with forward secrecy, P is also secure
in the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy.
Proof. We demonstrate that if protocol P satisfies FS-SIM-BMP security, then
the advantage of any adversary A in the FS-IND-RoR experiment is bounded by
n/|pw|+negl(λ), where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized
by A .
For clarity the proof is divided in two parts which we summarize here:
1. First we build a real-world adversary BA from A . The motivation is to gen-
erate a real-world transcript RWT according to the FS-SIM-BMP model but
following A’s commands. Additionally, since P is FS-SIM-BMP secure, the
simulatability definition guarantees the existence of an ideal-world transcript
IWT ∗ that is computationally indistinguishable from the RWT . Additionally,
we show that one can use the previously generated RWT to instantiate again
A and obtain identical executions of the previously simulated experiment to
A . The same reasoning applies when initializing A according to IWT ∗.
2. We build a distinguisher DA using A as a subroutine, whose goal is to tell
apart RWT from IWT ∗ transcripts. The distinguisher looks at whether A
wins his security challenge when initialized with the given transcript. From
this, we can bound the advantage of A in the FS-IND-RoR experiment to at
most n/|pw|+negl(λ).
Concrete details of Part 1 and Part 2 follow:
Part 1. We constructBA using anA as a subroutine, whereBA uses his ownRM
to answer A’s queries. BA can perfectly simulate the FS-IND-RoR experiment to
A (see Table 1). The objective is to generate a transcript RWT from the interaction
RM vs BA . The resulting transcript will be used in the second part of the proof.
We detail the construction of BA , however, a reader familiar with FS-SIM-BMP
and FS-IND-RoR security models could simply go to Table 1 and notice that BA
can perfectly simulate the FS-IND-RoR experiment to A .
– The interaction RM vs BA starts when the former initializes BA with ran-
dom tape rtB - as described in Section 3. Next BA , who simulates the chal-
lenger CH in the FS-IND-RoR game, generates a uniformly distributed bit-
string rtA and initializes A with random tape rtA .
– BA sets b $←− {0,1} outside A’s view.
– BA uses his RM to answer A’s queries: When A makes Initialize user,
Initialize user instance or Send queries, BA simply forwards them to his
RM and its response (if any) is forwarded back to A . Execute queries asked
by A are converted into Send queries appropriately. See Table 1.
– BA answers A’s Test query using his Application query and the bit b. If
there was a Corrupt and a Send query, then BA uses his Application query to
reveal skiU . Otherwise, if b = 1 then BA uses his Application query to reveal
skiU , however, if b = 0, then BA generates a random string r←{0,1}lsk and
gives it to A . In order to avoid strategies where A could trivially win the
game, whenever b = 0 the same r is returned for test queries asked to two
partnered instances 9.
– The experiment continues and A is allowed to make more queries as she
wishes. Eventually, A outputs her guess b′ and the FS-IND-RoR game fin-
ishes.
– BA makes an application query and writes in the transcript the string “b,rtA”.
For the sake of the proof, it is not necessary to write the bit b′ in the tran-
script.
The real-world transcript created is RWT . Furthermore, the FS-SIM-BMP defi-
nition guarantees the existence of a corresponding ideal-world transcript IWT ∗,
i.e. ∀B ∃B∗ such that RWT c≡ IWT ∗.
Remark 4. Given either RWT or IWT ∗, it is possible create instances of A as
needed, simulate to A the FS-IND-RoR experiment and obtain identical execu-
tions as recorded in the corresponding transcript. The reason is that A can be
9 In order to achieve sound simulation, we assume that partnering information is publicly com-
putable [30].
initialized with random tape rtA contained in the transcript, and then A’s behav-
ior is deterministic and known in advance – given the corresponding transcript
–. Rewinding the adversary to a specific state is a standard proof technique [44].
However, our requirement is simpler since we only need to initialize and run A
from the beginning.
Part 2. We use sequence of games and the previously generated transcript to
demonstrate that FS-SIM-BMP Security⇒ FS-IND-RoR Security.
Let G0 be the experiment where A is initialized according to the real-world tran-
script RWT , i.e. a real-world adversary BA is simulating the FS-IND-RoR ex-
periment to A . Let S0 be the event where A outputs b′ = b in G0. It holds that
Pr [S0 ] = Pr [A wins | t = RWT ].
Let G1 be the experiment where A is initialized according to the ideal-world
transcript IWT ∗. Let S1 be the event where A wins his FS-IND-RoR experiment
in G1; then Pr [S1 ] = Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ].
We first analyze the term Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]. Provided that FS-SIM-BMP
security holds, we will then show that A can not notice the transition from G0
to G1, and this will give us a bound on the advantage of A in the FS-IND-RoR
experiment.
Assume for now we are in experiment G1 and consider how the keys in IWT ∗
were generated. Let γ be the event that at least one sk is generated via expose
connection assignment as a result of a test instance password query that occurs
during the execution of B∗ interacting with RM ∗, i.e. a successful online dic-
tionary attack. Let β be the complement of γ, i.e. the event that no successful
password guess occurred during the interaction of B∗ and RM ∗.
Claim 1 Pr(γ)≤ n/|pw|. 10
Proof. For a single user instance, by definition of the ideal world, the probability
of a successful password guess by B∗ is 1/|pw|. We apply the union bound, and
get that if there are at most n instances, Pr(γ)≤ n/|pw|. uunionsq
Claim 2 Pr(b = b′ | β) = 1/2. 10
Proof. Given than β occurs, the session keys placed in IWT ∗ were generated
either by i) expose connection assignment -provided that there was a Corrupt
query before the connection assignment- or ii) open or connect connection as-
signment. Then, whenever A makes a Test query to an instance whose session
key was generated via case i), the simulator answers with the real sk computed
at the tested instance, i.e. the answer is independent of the bit b by definition of
the FS-IND-RoR experiment. Similarly, whenever A makes a Test query to an in-
stance whose session key was generated via case ii), the simulator answers with
a random string independent of the bit b. Therefore, the view of A is independent
of the hidden bit b so Pr(b = b′ | β) = 1/2. uunionsq
10 While these equations looks similar to that of earlier conference paper [10], the interpretation
is different. In the present work, the underlying security models incorporate forward secrecy
as explicity requirement.
Using Claim 1 and Claim 2 we get:
Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ] = Pr[(b′ = b) | γ] ·Pr [γ ]
+Pr
[
(b′ = b) | β] ·Pr [β ]
Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]≤ 1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| .
10 (4)
Equation 4 expresses the observation that, by construction of the ideal-world, an
adversary cannot do better than online dictionary attacks.
Now, we build a PPT algorithm DA whose aim is to distinguish real-word from
ideal-world transcripts.DA gets as input a transcript t ∈ {RWT, IWT ∗}, and uses
it to initialize a PPT adversary A and simulate a FS-IND-RoR experiment to A .
The simulation will be either G0 or G1. If SIM-security holds, then DA can-
not distinguish real world and ideal world transcripts, and so A cannot win his
FS-IND-RoR experiment with advantage greater than n/|pw|+negl(λ).
In more details, on input some transcript t, DA proceeds as follows:
– Look for the last record of the transcript containing the string “b,rtA”.
– D “simulates” the challenger in the FS-IND-RoR experiment and initializes
A on random tape rtA . Since A is given rtA , she behaves (deterministic) the
same way as recorded in the transcript t. Every query asked by A can be
answered by D by just reading t.
– Eventually A outputs her guess b′ and D proceeds as follows: If b = b′ D
outputs “1” and if b 6= b′ it outputs “0”. Additionally, when a bad event
occurs, e.g. A cannot be initialized, or her queries cannot be answered by
reading t, then D outputs ⊥.
A wins her FS-IND-RoR game whenever she outputs b′ = b. By construction of
D it holds that:
Pr [1←D(RWT ) ] = Pr [S0 ]
and
Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ] = Pr [S1 ].
From Equation 3 of FS-SIM-BMP security we know the following holds:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]| ≤ negl(λ). 10 (5)
Then it holds that |Pr [S0 ]−Pr [S1 ]| ≤ negl(λ). By definition of G0 and G1:
|Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]−Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]| ≤ negl(λ). 10 (6)
The term Pr [A wins | t = RWT ] is actually the probability of A winning on a
perfectly simulated FS-IND-RoR experiment. We combine with Equation 4 and
get:
Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]≤ 1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| +negl(λ)
We obtain that, if FS-SIM-BMP-security holds, then ∀ PPT A AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A)≤
n/|pw|+negl(λ), proving that FS-SIM-BMP⇒ FS-IND-RoR. uunionsq
Now we investigate the reverse, i.e. whether FS-IND-RoR security also implies
FS-SIM-BMP security. We obtain the following result:
Theorem 2. If P is not FS-SIM-BMP secure, then ∃A s.t. AdvRoRP,pw(A)> nA/|pw|+
ω, where nA is the number of explicit password guesses of A and ω is a non-
negligible function of the security parameter.
Proof. We build a FS-IND-RoR adversary AB , as the sequential composition of
two adversaries: A1 and AB2 . First, A
B invokes A1. A1 tries a number of online
dictionary attacks. If one of these is successful, thenAB can win the FS-IND-RoR
experiment. If none of the online dictionary attacks is successful, thenAB invokes
AB2 . Next, we describe the details of A1 and A
B
2 .
i) Construction of A1. Let A1 be an adversary who tries to masquerade user U to
user V nA times. Each time, A1 chooses a new candidate password and runs the
protocol with V . If one of the password guesses is successful, then A1 can win
the IND-RoR experiment. By construction,
Pr [A1 wins ] =
nA
|pw| .
10 (7)
ii) Construction of AB2 . We have assumed that FS-SIM-BMP security does not
hold. Then ∃B ∀B∗ ∃D s.t.:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]|> ω ,10 (8)
where ω is non-negligible term.
Let AB2 be an adversary in the FS-IND-RoR experiment which uses B and D as
subroutine. The game AB2 vs CH proceeds as follows:
– At the beginning of the experiment, CH chooses a bit b at random and out-
side AB2 ’s view.
– AB2 uses B as subroutine and answers B’s queries as follows: When B asks
for Initialize user, Initialize user instance, Send or Corrupt queries, AB2 sim-
ply forwards them to her CH and its response (if any) is forwarded back to
B .
– AB2 uses her Test query to answer B’s Application queries. When B asks
for an application of the efficiently computable function f on skiU and a
global random string R, AB2 asks Test(U, i) to her CH , obtains sk
i
U , com-
putes f (skiU ,R) and sends the result to B .
Claim 3 The transcript produced by AB2 is either RWT or IWT
∗.
Proof. B’s actions produce a transcript t. Consider the following scenario: B
asks an Application query and AB2 answers it by asking a Test query to his own
challenger. Without loss of generality, let us consider fresh instances, i.e. those
where we give credit to the adversary if he answers with b′ = b: If b = 1, AB2 ’s
Test queries are answered with real session keys, else if b = 0 AB2 gets a random
string taken from the session key space. Therefore, AB2 ’s answer to B’s applica-
tion queries is either a function of the real session key or a function of a random
string. Looking at the definition of the real and ideal-world transcripts, we con-
clude that whenever b = 1 the transcript generated is real-world while if b = 0
the transcript is ideal world. The reason is that in the real-world, the user in-
stances compute their sk’s according to the description of the protocol and only
such computed sk’s are placed transcript. However, in the ideal-world, the ses-
sion keys placed in the transcript are i) random strings provided that freshness
condition is satisfied or ii) no restriction about sk provided that freshness is not
satisfied, i.e. the simulator is given the freedom to specify the session key as he
wishes. uunionsq
Let D be the PPT distinguisher whose existence is guaranteed by the negation of
FS-SIM-BMP security.11 Next,AB2 invokesD(t) and simply forwardsD’s output
to CH . By construction, AB2 wins whenever D is able to distinguish real-world
from ideal-world transcripts. Therefore:
Pr
[
AB2 wins
]
= Pr [b = 1 ] ·Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]
+Pr [b = 0 ] ·Pr [0←D(IWT ∗) ] ,
which using Equation 8 gives:
Pr
[
AB2 wins
]
>
1
2
+ω. 10 (9)
We build A as the sequential composition of A1 and AB2 . It follows that:
Pr
[
AB wins
]
=Pr [A1 wins ]+Pr
[
AB2 wins
]
−Pr [A1 wins ]·Pr
[
AB2 wins
]
,
which from Equations 7 and 9 yields:
Pr
[
AB wins
]
>
nA
2 · pw +
1
2
+ω
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A
B )>
nA
pw
+ω, 10 (10)
where ω is a non-negligible function. uunionsq
Unfortunately, Theorem 2 is not enough to prove that FS-IND-RoR security im-
plies FS-SIM-BMP security. The reason is that the total number of instances ini-
tialized by our construction of A is nA + nB, where nA is the number of explicit
password guesses of subroutine A1 and nB is the number of instances initial-
ized while subroutine AB2 is simulating the real world ring master to B . There-
fore, proving by contradiction that FS-IND-RoR⇒ FS-SIM-BMP would require
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A)> (nA +nB)/pw+ω.
We recall from Section 3 that there are two ways to take account of online dictio-
nary attacks in SIM-based security models for PAKEs:
1. Include a test instance password query in IW and require computational in-
distinguishability of RWT and IWT ∗.
2. Do not include a test instance password in IW but allow a non-negligible
bound on the distinguishability of RWT and IWT ∗.
The SIM-based model Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel [6] follows the first style. We
modify it so it follows the second style. We call the modified model FS-SIM-BMP’.
The only changes are the following:
1. Remove the test instance password query from IW in FS-SIM-BMP.
2. Relax the requirement of indistinguishability between real and ideal world.
11 Without loss of generality, we can assume D is more likely to output 1 on a real world than on
an ideal world transcript; otherwise, flip the output bit of D .
FS-SIM-BMP’ security. Protocol P is FS-SIM-BMP’ secure if it satisfies com-
pleteness and additionally for all Real World adversaries B , there exits an Ideal
World adversary B∗ such that for all distinguishers D:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]| ≤ n|pw| +negl(λ),
10 (11)
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized by B .
Next, we show that FS-IND-RoR security implies FS-SIM-BMP’ security.
Theorem 3. (FS-IND-RoR Security⇒ FS-SIM-BMP’ Security). If protocol P is
secure in the IND-RoR model with forward secrecy, then P is also secure in the
SIM-BMP’ model with forward secrecy.
Proof. This is a proof by contradiction and the strategy is similar to the one
employed in Theorem 2.
We assume that FS-SIM-BMP’ security does not hold. Then ∃B ∀B∗ ∃D s.t.:
|Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]−Pr [1←D(IWT ∗) ]|> n|pw| +ω,
10 (12)
where n is an upper bound on the number of sessions initialized and ω is a non-
negligible function.
Then, we build an adversaryAB using B andD as subroutines such thatA breaks
FS-IND-RoR security. We construct AB from B and D in exactly the same way
as we built AB2 from B and D in the proof of Theorem 2.
Using the same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2, we get:
Pr
[
AB wins
]
= Pr [b = 1 ] ·Pr [1←D(RWT ) ]
+Pr [b = 0 ] ·Pr [0←D(IWT ∗) ] ,
which using Equation 12 gives:
Pr
[
AB wins
]
>
1
2
+
n
2 · |pw| +ω ,
And finally from Equation 1:
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A
B )>
n
|pw| +ω,
10
but ω is not negligible, a contradiction. uunionsq
Now, we investigate the reverse, i.e. whether FS-SIM-BMP’ security implies
FS-IND-RoR security. We obtain the following result:
Theorem 4. (FS-SIM-BMP’ Security⇒ FS-IND-RoR Security). If protocol P is
SIM-BMP’ secure with forward secrecy, then for all PPT A , AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A) ≤
2 ·n/|pw|+negl(λ).
Proof. We follow the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 up to Equation
5, which we simply update according to the FS-SIM-BMP’ security definition
given in Equation 11. Hence:
|Pr [A wins | t = RWT ]−Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ]| ≤ n|pw| +negl(λ).
10 (13)
It is easy to see that Pr [A wins | t = IWT ∗ ] = 1/2 since A cannot gain any in-
formation about the hidden bit b. However, Pr [A wins | t = RWT ] = 1/2+1/2 ·
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A) as result of A running on a perfectly simulated FS-IND-RoR ex-
periment. Following Equation 13 we obtain:
AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A)≤
2 ·n
|pw| +negl(λ)
uunionsq
The guarantee that ∀A , AdvFS−RoRP,pw (A)≤ 2 ·n/|pw|+negl(λ) means that proto-
col P satisfies the definition of FS-IND-RoR security (Definition 1) with a degra-
dation factor c = 2. A similar constant factor appears in the reduction used in [5]
to prove that IND-RoR security implies IND-FtG security.
Using the results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 from [10], as well as the known
relation IND-RoR⇒ IND-FtG [5], we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The following relations hold
– SIM-BMP Security⇒ IND-FtG Security
– SIM-BMP Security⇒ SIM-BMP’ Security
The question of whether SIM-BMP’ Security ⇒ SIM-BMP Security remains
open. Note that SIM-BMP’⇒ SIM-BMP would imply that the three security no-
tions IND-RoR, SIM-BPM and SIM-BMP’ are equivalent. A similar reasoning
can be applied when considering forward secrecy in the aforementioned security
models.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Although PAKE is a widely studied primitive and found in real-world security
protocols, a clear relation between its major security notions (IND and SIM) was
missing in the literature. In this work, we aimed at filling this gap. We have sum-
marized the relations obtained in this work in Figure 2.
During our work on this topic, we identified some delicate definitional issues
veiled under the many subtleties of the security notions for PAKE. We recall
what we consider the most relevant:
– In IND-based models [4, 5] the possible states in which a user instance could
be are continue, reject, accept and terminate. Roughly speaking, an instance
is in accept state whenever it has computed the sk but is still waiting to re-
ceive another message – typically a confirmation code – to fulfill the protocol
specification, while an instance in terminate state means that it has computed
the sk, has finished the protocol execution and is not sending nor receiving
any other message. Particularly in the IND-FtG model, a Reveal query can
be asked to instances in accept state while a Test query can only be directed
to instances in terminate state. The aforementioned distinction between ac-
cept and terminate states does not exist in SIM-based models due to how the
ideal world is modeled. The idea is the following:
• In the SIM-BMP model, the Application query models the leakage of
session keys in higher level protocols. The implicit requirement is that
the corresponding user instance has terminated his protocol execution,
which is modeled in the Ideal-World via connection assignments.
• In IND-FtG model, the Reveal query models i) the leakage of session
keys in higher level protocols and ii) leakage of session keys before the
protocol is finished, i.e. accept state.
The aforementioned peculiarity is specially relevant for Corollary 1. In order
for the implication SIM-BMP ⇒ IND-FtG to hold, we require the Reveal
(U, i) query in the IND-FtG model to be legitimate only if the instance ΠiU
is in terminate state. It might be a minor difference between IND-based and
SIM-based models, yet we consider it is worth mentioning, specially because
it is generally assumed that SIM-based security definitions are stronger than
their corresponding IND-based ones. However, as we have just explained,
there are technicalities that need to be addressed when formally stating the
relation between the security models.
– A more remarkable difference between IND and SIM models for PAKEs is
how online dictionary attacks are captured in the security model. In IND-
base models, the advantage of an adversary is formulated according to pa-
rameter n, which represents the number of active instances created by the ad-
versary in question. Note that such a definition does not specify or take into
account the fact that the adversary’s strategy is randomized, and thus n may
be a randomized function as well. For instance, an adversary could create a
large number of instances with negligible probability making the bound on
its advantage grow. The difference between models with an explicit formula-
tion of a non-negligible bound on the advantage and models without such an
explicit formulation seems to be related to the difficulty in proving IND-RoR
⇒ SIM-BMP. Another related issue is about the password distribution and
the correlation of passwords between users. We leave the quest for a more
precise definition that would take into account the above-mentioned remarks
for future work.
– The SIM-BMP model offers a more meaningful security definition by bet-
ter capturing the capabilities of an attacker against a PAKE protocol, for
instance online dictionary attacks. Additionally, the SIM-BMP model does
not place any artificial constraints on the passwords distribution, whereas the
IND-RoR requires the passwords to be uniformly distributed and indepen-
dent. The last requirement might be difficult to satisfy in real scenarios. In
particular, it is known that certain passwords are more likely to be selected
than others and that users tend to choose similar passwords when connecting
to different services.
Finally, we demonstrated that the results obtained in [10] are still satisfied when
the corresponding security models incorporate forward secrecy as required secu-
rity property.
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